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Chapter 1 
INTROD U CTION  
The m atter to be addressed in this paper is tax reform  in M ontana. The 
major goal is to examine this widely debated issue from a theoretical, a political, and 
a public administration perspective. The discussion will include tax policy, criteria 
for judging a tax system, types of taxes, a comparison of tax systems in M ontana and 
other states, tax reform prospects in 1993, the state’s budget crisis, the Racicot vs. 
Bradley sales tax plans, the proper role of public administrators, and the effects of 
tax reform on the field of public administration in Montana.
Tax reform has been a popular topic in Montana for several years, and the 
question of whether or not Montana should adopt a sales tax has been hotly argued 
for at least 20 years. On two different occasions during that time period, the state’s 
voters have turned down proposals to initiate a sales tax.
O f all the issues in the 1992 election, tax reform is widely regarded as the 
primary focus of voter decision making. In an unusual situation, the 1992 election 
featured two candidates for governor running on a pledge of tax reform, with both 
plans including a sales tax. Several legislative candidates ran on a similar platform.
The voters favored Marc Racicot for governor, a Republican who had held 
the position of A ttorney General since 1988. He defeated veteran Dem ocrat 
legislator Dorothy Bradley, an attorney from Bozeman. The 1992 election also 
provided a notable surprise in that the Republicans unexpectedly gained control of 
the M ontana House of Representatives by a margin of 53-47. During the 1991 
legislative session, the Democrats had held a strong majority of 61-39, but a net
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
change of 14 seats provided the newly elected Republican governor with a friendly 
majority in the House. In the Senate, interestingly, the trend was reversed as the 
Dem ocrat majority moved from a margin of 28-22 to 30-20.
The make-up of the 1991 legislature caused there to be little movement in 
working toward any tax reform package, especially one that would include a sales tax. 
The Democrats who controlled both the Senate and the House in 1991 espoused a 
generally liberal philosophy in deciding policy, and many were plainspoken in their 
adamant opposition to a sales tax, regardless of its inclusion in any tax reform 
package. Even after the June 1992 Primary Election when the Democrats elected 
a governor candidate who actively supported a sales tax, many Dem ocrat legislative 
leaders continued to be cynical about the chances of a sales tax passing.
With a Republican governor and a Republican majority in the House of 
Representatives in 1993, a dramatic shift in direction is likely to occur. However, the 
dynamics of the formula become fairly complicated when the Dem ocrat-controlled 
Senate is considered. The Senate will have the ability to dismantle all Republican 
proposals, if they so desire, including tax reform. The end result could be the 
political gridlock that haunted the 1991 and 1992 legislative sessions due to having 
a Dem ocrat legislature and a Republican governor, neither of whom would 
compromise their positions.
The interplay between Governor Racicot and the legislature will be critical 
in determining whether the end result will be success through cooperation or failure 
through gridlock. The fate of tax reform and a sales tax for M ontana in the 1993
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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legislative session lies largely with the approach taken by the legislative leaders and 
the newly elected governor. Friendly rhetoric will soon m elt away when the hard 
issues, such as tax reform and sales tax, surface forcing the major players to deal with 
the challenge of cooperation or division.
In order to construct a prudent tax reform plan, its architects must be 
cautious and alert in testing the proposal, including any tax relief components for 
income and property taxes, against generally accepted criteria for long-term tax 
policy. In developing, examining, and applying those criteria, attention m ust also be 
paid to tax systems and rates in other, especially nearby, states so that 
competitiveness in attracting and retaining businesses and individuals can be 
achieved.
Much of the emphasis has been on the revenue side of the equation. 
However, especially considering M ontana’s massive budget deficit estim ated at 
exceeding $300 million, it is expected that the levels of state government spending 
will also be addressed in tax reform. During his campaign for governor, Marc 
Racicot pledged to cut spending drastically as part of his tax reform plan in order 
to develop a long-term balanced budget. If no cuts are made in the budget, then 
alternate sources of revenue besides a sales tax must be found, and reductions in 
property and income taxes will become much less likely to occur.
While the elected executive and legislative officials wrestle with the politics 
of tax reform, the public administrators of M ontana will be faced with many related 
decisions and problems. What effects will tax reform have on the budgeting process?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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With a projected budget deficit of perhaps $300 million, what role and approach 
should public administrators play in seeking appropriations? Should they be active 
advocates for their programs, or should they enthusiastically present areas and 
programs ripe for budget cuts, or should they take a neutral position? How can 
public administrators balance the virtues of efficiency and effectiveness in carrying 
out their programs under tight budgetary constraints? W hat role and approach 
should public administrators take in the process of prioritizing programs in 
preparation for eventual elimination of programs? Finally, what enduring effects will 
the policies of Governor Racicot and the 1993 legislative session have on the field 
of public administration in Montana?
This paper will begin by examining the issue of fair tax policy and how it 
relates to tax reform. The next step will be to discuss the criteria in judging a tax 
system in order to understand the various considerations that should be made in 
developing a balanced and fair tax reform plan. An explanation of the different 
types of taxes (property, income, sales, excise, and value-added) and a comparison 
of M ontana’s current tax system to those in other states will follow. The next section 
will address the political factors affecting tax reform in 1993, including the huge 
budget deficit and the major tax reform plans presented during the 1992 campaign. 
The paper’s final section will address tax reform as it will likely affect public 
administrators and the field of public administration in Montana. The conclusion 
will attem pt to recap the need for comprehensive and fair tax reform in M ontana by 
emphasizing the necessity of thoughtful cooperation.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2 
TAX POLICY
Despite general consensus across political lines and among several interested 
groups on the need for comprehensive tax reform in M ontana, actual changes in 
state and local tax policy have often been difficult to achieve not only in M ontana, 
but other states as well. One of the problems, of course, in putting together a tax 
reform package is that the goals of each plan’s architects are oftentimes quite 
diverse.
People and institutions advocate tax reform for a variety of admirable reasons; 
fairness, simplicity, funding enhancement, revenue diversification and stability, and 
economic development. These goals for tax reform can generate conflict between, 
for example, tax fairness and economic development. For instance, the tax reform 
plan of the Montana Association of Counties (MACO), the bill for which will be 
sponsored by Senator W aterman for consideration during the 1993 legislative session, 
was recently unveiled, and it understandably advocates using new tax revenues to 
increase funding for county governments.* In the view of MACO, their plan 
promotes tax fairness, but how will the M ontana Chamber of Commerce, for 
instance, judge its effect on economic development in M ontana?
* Senator Mignon W aterman on behalf of the Montana Association of Counties, 
"Montana Tax Reform Act of 1993," (Helena, Montana: September 25, 1992).
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The Citizens for Tax Justice fairly recently issued a report- charging that state 
and local tax structures around the country are regressive, and that lower- and 
middle-income persons pay disproportionately more in taxes than do the wealthy. 
The report calls for more reliance on progressive income taxes and less on 
consumption taxes. However, in disagreeing with the report, one might claim that 
most Americans prefer lower taxes and state policies that leave economic decisions 
in their hands. Philosophical disagreements such as these often give tax reform  high 
marks in rhetoric but low marks in actual implementation.
As a result, tax reform is a complicated issue and difficult to achieve. A 
general understanding of taxation as well as an analysis and evaluation of a sta te’s 
tax structure are important components in determining appropriate direction of tax 
reform measures. This section of the paper does not address tax reform, but rather 
outlines some basic principles related to state and local taxation policy and then 
describes the major state and local taxes levied in the United States.
Taxes can generally be defined as a compulsory contribution exacted by a 
government for public purposes. The basic purpose of taxation at the state and local 
level is to raise revenue for governmental expenditures. Indeed, taxes in general may 
be thought of as payments for benefits received by the public for governmental 
services. People would be unlikely to support a governmental program if they did
•Citizens for Tax Justice, A Far Cry from Fair: CTJ’s Guide to State Tax Reform. 
(Washington, D.C.: Citizens for Tax Justice, April 1991),
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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not benefit, at least indirectly, from the program. However, to allocate the tax 
burden based on benefits received by any one individual would be impractical. The 
benefits of governmental services are usually received by groups rather than by 
individuals. That appears to be the primary justification for governmental activity. 
Society generally regards the provision of such services as schools, prisons, welfare, 
and national defense as desirable collective undertakings through government. In 
addition, tax payments, unlike user fees, do not give rise to specific services in return 
and do not constitute an exchange in the usual economic sense. Because public 
expenditures may redistribute wealth, the level and incidence of public expenditures 
should also be taken into account.
Administrative costs are the costs to government for levying and collecting 
taxes. Administrative costs will vary from tax to tax and by the complexity of the tax. 
For instance, an income tax is typically more costly to administer than a sales tax; a 
narrow-based sales tax is usually more costly than a broad-based sales tax.
Compliance costs are the costs incurred by the taxpayer both in time and 
money to keep the necessary records and actually pay the tax. Because of the 
complexity of personal income taxes, compliance costs for this tax can be high. 
Obviously, the cost for some taxpayers will be higher than for others depending on 
whether the taxpayer itemizes deductions and on whether the taxpayer uses an 
accountant or lawyer to prepare the return. While compliance may be costly to the 
taxpayer it is justified by a more equitable outcome.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Although issues such as who should bear the burden of taxation and who, in 
fact, does bear the burden may be of secondary concern when taxes are imposed to 
finance or increase government services, they are important policy considerations 
nonetheless. These issues may be resolved in part by the standards of equity and 
good government held by the dominant political organizations and individuals. The 
common thread underlying these issues of taxation seems to be the notion of tax 
fairness.
In democratic societies, there appears to be largely universal agreem ent that 
everyone should bear his or her "fair share" for the cost of government. There is, 
however, no general agreement on how "fair share" should be defined, except 
perhaps the old saying, "Don’t tax me, and don’t tax thee; tax the feller behind the 
tree."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 3
CRITERIA  IN JU D G IN G  A TAX SYSTEM
In a study aimed at evaluating all aspects of state and local taxation, the Texas 
Select Committee on Tax Equity identified nine criteria for judging a "good" tax 
system: adequacy of revenue, equity, efficiency, stability, economic competitiveness, 
simplicity, balance, breadth of tax base, and intergovernmental linkages.
Based on that analysis, the Texas Select Committee collapsed the criteria into 
four broad categories;
1.) Adequacy of Revenue. A "good" tax system should produce 
adequate revenue to fund governmental services in a stable and 
predictable manner. The tax system should make use of a wide 
variety of revenue sources with the widest possible bases.
2.) Equity. A  "good" tax system should be fair, both to individual 
citizens and to businesses operating in the state.
3.) Economic Efficiency. A "good" tax system should not 
unnecessarily or unintentionally interfere with private economic 
decisions. It should be competitive with the tax systems used 
in other states, but it should not rely heavily on tax incentives 
that favor certain businesses or industries to the exclusion of 
others.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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4.) Simplicity. A "good" tax system should be as simple as possible 
to administer for both the taxpayer and the tax collector/
Perhaps a summary of these criteria would be that effective tax reform  
involves policies that remove exemptions or deductions or grant new ones and 
changes that make the tax system more balanced or more stable, easier to 
administer, easier to comply with, easier to understand, less regressive, more 
supportive of economic development, or more neutral.
For purposes of this paper, this section will briefly describe the following 
criteria that may be used to evaluate state and local tax systems: adequacy and 
stability of revenue; equity; economic efficiency (or neutrality) and tax 
competitiveness; and simplicity. These criteria will be discussed primarily from a 
conceptual perspective and may be considered in further exploration and 
development of technical analyses of M ontana’s state and local tax structure.
Part 1 - Adequacv and Stability of Revenue 
According to the criteria identified by the Texas Select Committee on Tax 
Equity, the first requirem ent of a tax system is to raise the required revenue to 
support the activities of government. The tax system should have the capacity, 
allowing for normal fluctuations, to provide a stable and predictable source of 
revenue for a given level of governmental services without the constant need for
^Texas Select Committee on Tax Equity, Rethinking Texas Taxes: Final R eport of the 
Select Committee on Tax Equitv. Vol. 1, January, 1989, Austin, Texas, pp. 29-30.
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revisions in the tax base or tax rates. The other side of the adequacy criterion is that 
the tax structure should not generate more revenue than is required to meet 
government obligations.
The revenue adequacy criterion appears to be a reasonable tax policy goal, 
given some accepted level of public expenditure. The appropriate level of public 
expenditure, however, is a judgment that is resolved through the political process, 
and this judgment may change over time. Depending on the dominant view of the 
desired level of government activity as represented in expenditure patterns, the 
expression of the revenue adequacy criterion may ebb and flow between the extreme 
ends of the political spectrum. At one extreme is the view that tax revenue should 
grow more slowly than the economy. This objective requires elected officials to vote 
on higher taxes for larger public expenditures, thus ensuring political accountability 
for increased taxes related to increased expenditures."^ Reliance on property taxes, 
sales taxes, and user fees are expressions of this view of revenue adequacy. The 
indexation of personal income taxes is another expression of this view.
A t the other extreme is the view that tax revenue should grow at a faster pace 
than the economy, thus ensuring revenue for perceived social needs while minimizing 
the political risk of explicitly imposing higher taxes.^ A tax structure that relies
‘John Shannon, "State Revenue Diversification - The Search for Balance," in The Q uest 
for Balance in State-Local Revenue Structures. Ed. by Frederick D. Stocker (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1987) p. 20.
"Ibid., p. 20.
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heavily on a steeply graduated progressive income tax is the preferred m ethod of 
taxation for this view because a progressive tax tends to grow more rapidly than the 
economy.
The adequacy of tax revenue is often analyzed in terms of its responsiveness 
to changes in the economy, usually personal income. The traditional m ethod of 
measuring the responsiveness of tax revenue relative to changes in personal income 
over time is the income elasticity of tax revenue. Income elasticity of tax revenue 
is the ratio of the percentage change in tax revenue to a corresponding percentage 
change in personal income between two time periods. If a tax source grows more 
slowly than personal income, it is "inelastic;” if it grows faster than personal income, 
it is "elastic." In other words, the elasticity of tax revenue is the measure of the 
growth in revenue relative to growth in the economy, usually in terms of personal 
income growth. An elastic tax tends to grow faster than personal income, while an 
inelastic tax tends to increase more slowly than personal income.
For a given tax rate and tax base, progressive income taxes are the most 
responsive to income growth. That is, personal income tax revenue tends to grow 
at a faster rate than personal income as individuals move into higher income tax 
brackets as a result of economic growth or inflation. Property tax revenue tends to 
grow more slowly than personal income, while sales taxes, depending on the base, 
may grow at about the same rate as personal income. The more responsive a tax is 
to changes in personal income, the less stable it is. Thus, a decline in personal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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income will result in a correspondingly greater decline in tax revenue from a highly 
responsive tax (e.g., the personal income tax).
A nother approach to evaluating the stability of a tax is to examine changes 
in revenue collections through economic cycles of expansion and contraction. 
Corporate profits, and hence corporate income taxes, are extremely sensitive to 
economic fluctuations. This sensitivity justifies the reluctance by state governments 
to rely heavily on the corporate income tax. The individual income tax is the next 
most sensitive to economic fluctuations, and property taxes and sales and excise taxes 
appear the least sensitive to economic cycles.® Using the business cycle to 
analyze the adequacy or stability of revenue may be a more reliable method than 
using the income elasticity of tax revenue because it better accounts for economic 
reality than does simply looking at income trends. The income elasticity approach 
might provide misleading information about the growth in revenue from the personal 
income tax. Even in a recession, for instance, personal income tends to rise because 
of pay increases for persons who remain at work. Individuals and businesses, 
however, alter their economic behavior in a recession, either by choice or of 
necessity. A delay in the purchase of "big ticket" consumer durable goods or capital 
equipm ent is one example of that changed behavior. Such changes in behavior may 
have a negative effect on tax collections that may be greater than would be expected
®Helen F. Ladd and Dana Weist, "General Sales Tax," in State and Local Finance for 
the I990’s: A Case Studv of Arizona. Ed. by Therese J. M cGuire and Dana Wolfe Naim ark 
(Tempe, Arizona; School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, 1986), p. 133.
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from simply analyzing changes in personal income. Conversely, in an expansion, 
individuals and businesses may alter their behavior to an extent that tax collections 
may be greater than would be expected from changes in personal income.
With respect to planning budgets and developing expenditure policies, state 
and local governments may want a smooth and predictable growth in tax revenues 
that roughly corresponds to growth in personal income or to an anticipated rate of 
growth in expenditure levels. A  reliable revenue source or sources would also be 
desirable if the demand for state and local government services increases with 
income. The "taste" for public goods and services, however, may be more strongly 
related to other variables (such as population size and composition) and to distinct 
preferences within a state.
Part 2 - Eouitv
A second criterion in evaluating a "good" tax system is equity. The equity 
criterion involves the policy question of how tax burdens should be apportioned 
among individuals within the state.
There are two concepts associated with the equity criterion: the benefits 
received principle and the ability-to-pay principle. The benefits received principle 
states that those who enjoy the benefits of goods and services provided by 
government should bear the burden of taxation in proportion to the am ount of 
benefits received. As the measure of equity, this principle links the expenditure and 
revenue sides of the budget and also links tax burdens with benefits derived from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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government. The benefits received principle is a theoretical concept that has limited 
applicability in the formulation of general tax policy. The principle is usually invoked 
when identifying certain groups of taxpayers who benefit from certain governmental 
services but who should not be recipients of a taxpayer subsidy.'
The alternative concept is the ability-to-pay principle. U nder this principle, 
the amount of taxes or level of tax burden should be related to an individual’s ability 
to pay based on economic well-being. Taxation under the ability-to-pay principle 
implies both horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity is rooted in the 
principle of equal treatm ent under the law.® That is, persons of roughly equal 
economic capacity should pay approximately the same amount in taxes. The related 
concept of vertical equity implies that persons with greater economic capacity should 
pay more taxes. Vertical equity can be measured in terms of whether the tax is 
progressive, proportional, or regressive according to whether payments rise, are 
constant, or fall as a proportion of income as income rises.
Vertical equity may be analyzed in terms of the incidence or burden of a tax. 
Tax burden relates to the reduction in family income or purchasing power caused by 
paying taxes. Tax burden studies attempt to determine the distribution of taxes, both
’John Wicks, et al., "An Integrated Tax Structure for Montana," in M ontana Taxation 
Task Force Papers, prepared for members of the Subcommittee on Taxation, (Helena, 
Montana, 1966).
®Richard A. Musgrave, Public Finance in a Democratic Society. Vol. 1, (New York: New 
York University Press, 1986), p. 261.
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direct and indirect, according to income class or group. The tax burden is m easured 
by the percentage of family or household income that is devoted to taxes. That 
percentage figure is referred to as the effective tax rate. Tax burden analyses employ 
a variety of assumptions about tax shifting and incidence, allocation of taxes by 
income group or class, and the appropriate household income base. Although a 
discussion of the models used in tax burden studies is beyond the scope of this paper, 
for a discussion of the historical development of tax burden and an analysis of the 
models used, see Who Pavs State and Local Taxes by Donald Phares, published in 
1980.
The final incidence of business taxes, for example, is an im portant 
consideration in tax burden studies. Businesses do not pay taxes in the economic 
sense; that is, business taxes are ultimately paid by individuals as indirect taxes. 
Business taxes may be shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher prices, or 
such taxes may be shifted backward to workers in the form of lower wages or to 
stockholders in the form of lower dividends. There is no general agreement on the 
direction or magnitude of tax shifting by business. Thus, the allocation of business 
taxes to individuals often depends on the judgment of the analyst.
Among recent studies, at least two have provided estimates of state and local 
tax burdens. One is a study conducted by the Tax Foundation (TF) in 1989.^ The
^ a x  Foundation, Tax Burden by Income Class. 1986-1987. (Washington, D.C.: Tax 
Foundation, 1989).
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purpose of the TF study was to provide a detailed nationwide analysis of the 
distributional impact of federal, state, and local taxes. The other study was 
conducted by the Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ).*® The primary purpose of the CTJ 
study was to estimate the impact, by state, of major state and local taxes.
Both studies show that personal income taxes are the most progressive 
element of the state and local tax structure. The CTJ study shows that the personal 
income tax is progressive throughout the income spectrum, while the TF study 
indicates that personal income taxes tend to be proportional for income classes 
$40,000-$49,000 and above.
According to the CTJ analysis, the tax burden of the corporation income tax 
is generally proportional for incomes up to $82,000 but slightly progressive after that. 
The CTJ study assumes that the corporate income tax is borne by owners of capital 
in the form of lower dividends.
The TF study, on the other hand, shows that the corporate income tax 
imposes a greater burden on low income families than on middle income families. 
The tax burden, however, tends to be progressive at the higher income levels. The 
TF study assumes that half the corporate income tax is shifted forward to consumers 
as higher prices and half to owners of capital as lower dividends. Thus, the 
corporation income tax is regressive for lower income families because consumption
“̂Citizens for Tax Justice, A  Far Cry from Fair: CTJ’s Guide to State Tax Reform . 
(Washington, D C.: Citizens for Tax Justice, April 1991).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
expenditures take a greater proportion of their family income; whereas the tax is 
progressive for upper income families because dividend income is more concentrated 
in these income groups.
As might be expected, both studies show that sales taxes and excise taxes are 
regressive throughout the income spectrum. The TF study shows that excise taxes 
impose a greater burden on families at every income level than is shown by the CTJ 
study.
The analyses of property tax burdens exhibit somewhat divergent trends. The 
CTJ study shows that property taxes are regressive throughout the entire income 
scale. The TF study shows that the property tax is regressive at lower income levels, 
proportional in the middle income range, and progressive in the upper income levels.
Each study shows slightly different results in the total tax burden of the major 
taxes. According to the CTJ study, the state and local tax structure is regressive 
throughout the income spectrum, while the TF study indicates that the tax structure 
is regressive until the highest income level is reached. Both studies, however, show 
virtually identical disparity between the tax burden borne by the lowest income class 
or group and by the highest income class or group.
Although the results of the two studies exhibit some similar equity patterns 
by type of tax, they are not strictly comparable because of differences in purpose, 
methodology and assumptions, data sources, and year analyzed. Some differences 
have already been noted.
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Table: State and Local Taxes in Montana as Share of Income for Family of Four, 1991
Family Income 
Group
Lowest
20%
Second
20%
Middle
20%
Fourth
20%
Top 20%
Next
15%
Next 4% Next 1 %
Average Income 38,900 321,300 331,700 343,300 366,600 3139,600 3708,200
Personal Income 
Taxes 0.4% 1.9% 2.4% 2.9% 3.5% 4.6% 5.0%
Corporate 
Income Taxes 0.0% 0.0% 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1% 0.1% 0.4%
Property Taxes 3.3% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.1% 2.3% 1.4%
Sales Taxes 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Excise Taxes 2.9% 1.6% 1.3% 1.0% 0.8% 0.5% 0.1 %
Total Taxes 7.1 % 7.4% 7.4% 7.6% 7.6% 7.7% 7.0%
Federal Offset 
Deduction 0.0% -0.2% -0.3% -0.6% -1.7% -2.0% -1.7%
Total After 
Offset 7.1% 7.2% 7.2% 7.0% 5.9% 5.7% 5,3%
The above table shows CTJ estimates of the tax burden on a family of four 
in M ontana in 1991. The total tax burden in M ontana before the federal offset 
deduction indicates a generally proportional state and local tax structure. A
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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progressive income tax and the absence of a sales tax account for much of the 
proportionality of M ontana’s tax burden. The federal offset deduction appears to 
make the Montana tax structure slightly regressive in the highest income quintile.
Although revenue adequacy and tax equity are separate policy issues, they are 
linked. Property taxes and sales taxes (typically regressive taxes) tend to grow more 
slowly than personal income, and tax policies that reduce the regressivity of the tax 
structure are likely to lead to enhanced revenue growth.
Part 3 - Economic Neutralitv/Efficiencv 
Economic neutrality is a third criterion for evaluating a "good" tax structure. 
U nder normal conditions, competitive markets provide an efficient allocation of 
scarce resources. Economic efficiency in competitive markets is distorted if taxation 
policies unintentionally affect business decisions on price and output, consumer 
decisions on consumption patterns, or individual decisions on whether or not to 
work.” A  specific sales or excise tax has the effect of raising the price of the 
product taxed. As a result, consumers will tend to purchase less of the taxed item 
and more of an untaxed item. For example, a selective excise tax on soda pop may 
cause consumers to purchase less soda pop and more of untaxed beverages (e.g., tea 
or juice). If that happens, the tax is economically inefficient because it alters 
economic choices.
” Final Report of the Pennsvlvania Tax Commission. Richard M. Cyert, Chairman, 
(Pittsburgh: Camegie-M ellon University, March 1981), p. 12.
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The same analysis may be applied to a general sales tax. For example, a sales 
tax that exempts services favors consumers with preferences for services. As a result, 
there may be a shift from consumer goods to consumer services. Furtherm ore, 
spending patterns differ by family preferences within income groups so that a sales 
tax that exempts services imposes differential tax burdens among families with equal 
tax-bearing capacity^", thus violating the principle of horizontal equity.
A  personal income tax structure characterized by relatively high marginal tax 
rates may discourage individuals from working and encourage more leisure. 
Similarly, relatively high rates of taxation on the wealth of businesses may discourage 
capital accumulation or may encourage a business to relocate to a state where tax 
policies are perceived as more favorable. On the other hand, economic neutrality 
is enhanced if competing firms face the same effective tax rates m easured against a 
common base.'^
A tax structure that is competitive with other states is a criterion often 
considered in relation to economic neutrality. A  state’s tax structure is often equated 
with the "business climate" of the state. Proponents of economic development often 
compare the "pro-business" tax policies of surrounding states and use the comparison 
as justification for changing the state’s tax policy or for obtaining a tax concession.
^^John L. Mikesell, "General Sales Tax", in Reforming State Tax Svstems, Ed. Steven D. 
Gold (Denver: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1986), p. 212.
"R obert P. Strauss, "Business Taxes," in Reforming State Tax Svstems. (Denver: 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 1986), p. 236.
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A good example in Montana is the ongoing debate over the proper level of coal 
severance tax in order to be competitive with Wyoming’s coal industry.
Some studies analyzing the effects of business taxation have generally 
concluded that differences in state tax levels and tax incentives have little or no 
impact on a firm’s location decisions. In a fairly recent report on taxation and 
expenditure policies in M ontana^  Beattie and Young reiterate this point by noting 
that until recently, most economic studies showed that state and local taxes were 
relatively insignificant factors in business location decisions. They point out, 
however, that more recent research may suggest otherwise. They describe a study 
by Benson and Johnson^^ that focuses on the measurement of relative tax rates 
among states. According to this study, existing differentials in tax rates between 
states are not so great as to cause widespread changes in location. Changes in 
location would occur when tax policies in one state are significantly altered relative 
to other states. However, the general immobility of business property usually 
precludes an immediate response to such changes in tax policy.
Obviously, many factors other than tax policy affect economic activity and 
business location decisions. Labor costs and other factor inputs - geography, access
“̂̂ Bruce R. Beattie and Douglas J. Young, Montana Taxation and Expenditure: Issues 
and Options. (Bozeman, Montana: Montana State University, July 1988).
^^Bruce L. Benson and Ronald N. Johnson, "The Lagged Impact of State and Local 
Taxes on Economic Behavior," in Economic Inquiry, vol. 24, 1986, pp. 389-401. Cited in 
Beattie and Young, M ontana Taxation and Expenditures: Issues and Options. (Bozeman, 
Montana: M ontana State University, July 1988).
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to markets, regulatory policies, "quality-of-life," and general economic conditions - 
may all be relatively more important than tax considerations in business location 
decisions. In addition, companies with a major capital commitment to a state may 
prefer higher taxes if those taxes enhance the infrastructure within the state and 
increase the level of public services.
Regardless of the evidence of whether tax policies relating to business 
influence business decisions, state legislatures often appear eager to grant 
concessions. Ideally, states should develop some procedure to m easure the 
effectiveness of tax concessions as an economic development tool. Until there is 
some mechanism to do this, business tax policy may be influenced more by d em ag o g  
and misinformation than facts empirical data.
Part 4 - Simplicity of Compliance and Administration 
Few would disagree that a tax system should be easy for taxpayers to 
understand and for government to administer. Beyond that, simplicity is neither 
easily defined nor easily measured. A tax that was "simple" in the sense of being 
easy to determine may conflict with other tax policy goals. For example, a head tax 
may be the easiest tax to comply with and to administer. However, a head tax would 
be unrelated to a taxpayer’s ability to pay and would not provide adequate revenue 
growth. Similarly, a gross receipts tax would be simpler to calculate and easier to 
administer than a net income tax, but it would conflict with the concept of horizontal 
equity.
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Many states, including Montana, conform their personal income taxes and 
corporation taxes to federal income tax laws. Although federal income tax laws are 
extremely complex, conformity at the state level accomplishes the following: (1) 
makes a state tax return easier to complete; (2) requires only one set of books; (3) 
eliminates the need for separate determinations of factual and legal questions; and 
(4) reduces the costs of administration.*® Total conformity with federal taxes may 
further enhance simplicity but would severely limit flexibility in implementing state 
tax policy objectives.
There is an inherent complexity in determining taxable income for 
corporations that operate in more than one state. A state can only tax corporate 
income that is attributable to the state, and state tax administrators must be able to 
determine the amount of a corporation’s federal income that is taxable to the state.
The property tax is probably the most difficult tax to administer and to 
understand and is frequently the target of taxpayer protests. There are many reasons 
that the property tax is perceived as unfair. Perhaps the most significant is the 
apparent capriciousness of assessed values. Taxpayers become upset when they 
discover that their property is valued higher (and the resulting tax bill is higher) than 
the property of their neighbors. W hether the difference is justified or not, the fact 
of the difference leads to an inherent mistrust of the property tax.
*®Richard D. Pomp, "Simplicity and Complexity of a State Tax System," in Reforming 
State Tax Svstems. (Denver: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1986), p. 122.
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In Montana, the property tax classification system adds to the complexity, 
confusion, and mistrust of the tax. During the June 1989 Special Session and the 
52nd Legislative Session, the Montana Legislature simplified the property tax 
structure by reducing from 20 to 12 the total number of property classes. Similar 
reductions have occurred in the past. In 1978, there were 20 different property 
classes; in 1983, there were 12 property classes; in 1985, sixteen; and in 1987, twenty. 
These vacillations cause taxpayers to speculate about the Legislature's commitment 
to tax fairness and simplicity.
Part 5 - Conclusion
There are many criteria that may be used to evaluate a tax system. This 
paper has highlighted a few of the commonly considered criteria of a "good" tax 
system; adequacy and stability of tax revenue; equity; economic neutrality (or 
efficiency) and tax competitiveness; and simplicity.
None of the desirable features of a tax system can be fully realized in any 
practical sense. Prayers at the altar of tax equity or the altar of tax competitiveness 
may often go unanswered. Their imperfect achievement can only be obtained 
through tradeoffs in the political system.
Among citizens and policymakers in the U nited States, it is probably true that 
tax fairness may be the most important goal for any tax system. However, the 
concept of tax equity involves value judgments. The diversity in state and local tax 
structures, including policy preferences for one particular tax over another, indicates
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that no consensus has yet been agreed upon in determining the most equitable tax 
system. In addition, social and other policy goals figure into the development of any 
state and local tax structure. The question for policymakers is how to strike a 
balance between competing goals.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 4
TYPES O F TAXES AND COM PARISON W ITH O TH ER  STATES 
The major taxes levied by state and local governments are the property tax, 
the income tax, the sales tax, and to a much lesser extent selective excise taxes, 
including motor fuels taxes and motor vehicle license taxes. This section will 
examine these various types of taxes.
Part 1 - Propertv Tax 
The property tax is an ancient form of taxation and has historically been a 
major source of revenue in the United States. However, with the advent of other 
types of taxes at the national and state levels, property taxation has become primarily 
a local government tax.
Property taxes are levies on tangible property including personal property and 
land and improvements, and to a much lesser extent on intangible property. The tax 
bill under the property tax is determined by multiplying the tax rate times the 
property's m arket value. Since property, especially real property, is sold infrequently, 
the value is usually determ ined by assessment or appraisal by a public official.
Property may be taxed uniformly or under a classification system. U nder a 
uniform taxation system, all property, real and personal, is assessed at m arket value 
and is subject to the same statutory tax rate. U nder a classification system, different 
tax rates (the amount of tax as a percentage of market value) are established for 
different types or "classes" of property. The classification system assigns every
27
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taxable piece of property to a particular class of property and establishes interclass 
differentials.^^
From an equity viewpoint, there is a question of whether the value of a 
particular piece of property is a good measure of the ability-to-pay. The value of a 
person’s property may be indicative of benefits received for certain public services 
such as public education and public safety. On the other hand, the value of property 
may not reflect benefits received for other governmental services and the value of 
a person’s property may not be closely related to income. Also the property owner 
may face relatively high tax burdens in relation to the level or quality of services 
provided.
There is a tendency for property values to be capitalized to reflect tax liability 
and the level of government services. Capitalization refers to the adjustment in the 
price of an asset that takes into account the stream of future benefits and costs 
associated with ownership of the asset. The market value of property may be higher 
in an area where there are high levels of desirable public services. People are likely 
willing to pay more for housing in these areas and the value of the amenities of the 
public services are capitalized into higher market values. Conversely, the m arket 
value of property may be lower in areas where tax liabilities are high but without 
offsetting high levels of public services.
‘’John H. Bowman, "Real Property Classification," in State and Local Finance for the 
1990’s: A Case Studv of Arizona. Ed. by Therese J. McGuire and Dana Wolf Naimark 
(Tempe, Arizona: School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University), p. 426.
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In 1986, the M ontana electorate, apparently disgruntled with rapidly escalating 
property (and perhaps other) taxes and the perception of inordinately high property 
tax burdens, passed the ballot measure Initiative 105. That initiative provided that 
property taxes were to be frozen at their 1986 level until such time in the future 
when the Montana legislature would provide for comprehensive tax reform that 
would include a plan designed to reduce property tax burdens, while at the same 
time providing revenue levels sufficient to fund future state and local government 
needs.
Part 2 - Individual/Personal Income Taxes 
The personal income tax, which is largely a creature of the twentieth century, 
is the single largest source of state tax revenue in Montana and exists in all but seven 
states (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming). 
Because of the importance of the personal income tax to the state’s revenue 
structure, it has often been the object of tax reform efforts. During the last three 
regular legislative sessions, several proposals have been introduced to revise the way 
personal income is taxed. These proposals have included taxing income based on a 
percentage of federal liability, changing the tax base to federal taxable income, 
revising the rate structure, and limiting the deduction for federal taxes. These 
proposals have been introduced to enhance tax equity, to reduce administrative and
^®Larry Finch, "The Value-Added Tax: An Alternative Approach to Comprehensive Tax 
Reform in Montana," (Helena, Montana: Office of Research and Information, M ontana 
D epartm ent of Revenue, September 1992), p. 1.
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compliance costs, to improve the state’s business climate, and, perhaps secondarily, 
to increase state tax revenue.’®
Reliance on the personal income tax varies substantially among the states. 
The table below shows the percentage of personal income taxes to total state tax 
revenue in Montana and 12 surrounding states in 1990.
Table: Personal income Tax Collections as a Share of Total State Tax Collections, 1990
State income Tax Collections 
(Thousands of Dollars)
income Tax as a 
Percent of Total
Arizona $1,063,804 24.3%
Colorado 1,341,695 43.7%
Idaho 403,461 35.4%
Minnesota 2,876,636 42.2%
Montana 279,643 32.6%
Nevada -0- -0-
New Mexico 360,971 17.9%
North Dakota 105,687 15.6%
Oregon 1,826,646 65.6%
South Dakota -0- “0 “
Utah 646,830 36.6%
Washington -0- -0“
Wyoming -0- -0-
United States 96.076 ,243 32.0%
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Tax Collections: 1990 . (Washington* D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1991).
’̂ Conversation with Denis Adams, Director of the Montana D epartm ent of Revenue, 
September 1992.
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Four of the seven states without a personal income tax are within the 
comparison region. Oregon clearly relies extremely heavily on personal income 
taxes, and Colorado and Minnesota rank next highest on the table. The reliance on 
personal income taxes in Montana, at 32.6 percent, is about the same as in the 
nation as a whole.
Total tax collections do not provide a meaningful comparison between states 
because of differences in population and economic capacity (as m easured by personal 
income). Interstate tax comparisons, however, can be made by using per capita 
collections or by using collections relative to personal income of the state. O n the 
basis of income tax revenue per capita and per thousand dollars of personal income 
in fiscal year 1990, Montana ranked sixth among the nine comparison states with an 
individual income tax and ranked 26th in the nation as a whole. Per capita income 
tax collections in M ontana were 90 percent of the U.S. average.^®
Measuring taxes relative to personal income provides a more accurate 
estimate of a state's relative tax burden than do per capita levels. For example, tax 
collections per thousand dollars of personal income indicate the relationship between 
tax levels and economic activity within the state. Using this measure, M ontana, a 
relatively low-income state, appears to devote an average share of personal income 
to personal income taxes.
^°U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Tax Collections: 1990. (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Governm ent Printing Office, August 1991), p. 44.
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The table below compares tax rates and taxable income bracket am ounts for 
those states within the comparison region that impose a personal income tax. The 
table shows considerable variability in tax rates and bracket amounts. North Dakota 
and M ontana have the highest top marginal tax rate of any state in the region at 12 
percent and 11 percent respectively. The lowest bracket amount ranges from $1,000 
in Idaho to $20,000 in Arizona, while the highest bracket amount ranges from $5,000 
in Oregon to $300,000 in Arizona. Montana appears to be on the low end of these 
scales. The number of income tax brackets also varies considerably among the states.
The table also shows w hether federal income taxes are deductible. M ontana 
and North Dakota are the only states in the region that allow full deductibility of 
federal income taxes. Oregon and U tah limit the deduction.
Table; State Individual Income Tax Rates as of June 1991
Lowest
Bracket
Rate
To Taxable 
Income of
Highest
Bracket
Rate
To Taxable 
Income of
Number of 
Brackets
Federal 
Inc. Tax 
Deduct.
Arizona 3.8% $20,000 7% $300,000 5 No
Colorado 5% of federal taxable income NA No
Idaho 2% 1,000 8.2% 20,000 8 No
Minnesota 6% 19,910 8.5% 79,120 3 No
Montana 2% 1,600 11% 57,800 10 Yes
New Mexico 1.8% 5,200 8.5% 41,600 7 No
North Dakota 2.67% 3,000 12% 50,000 8 Yes
Oregon 5% 2,000 9% 5,000 3 Limited
Utah 2.55% 1,500 7.2% 7,500 6 Limited
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The above table is presented for illustrative purposes only. By itself, the 
information contained in the table has limited value for making interstate tax 
comparisons because of differences in such factors as the tax base, allowable 
deductions, the level of personal exemption deductions or credits, and the filing 
status of the taxpayer. However, there is certainly some value in observing the 
differences in tax systems.
U nder a graduated progressive income tax structure, inflation causes 
unlegislated increases in the real burden of the income tax (commonly referred to 
as "bracket creep"). One way to alleviate bracket creep is to index the taxable 
income bracket amounts to inflation.
In November, 1980, Montana voters approved an initiative to index personal 
income taxes to inflation. Under the initiative, an inflation factor is applied to the 
income tax brackets, personal exemptions, the standard deduction, and the minimum 
filing requirements. The inflation factor is determined for each tax year by dividing 
the Consumer Price Index for June 1980 by the Consumer Price Index for June of 
the tax year.
The table below shows taxable income for each income tax bracket in nominal 
and inflation-adjusted amounts for tax year 1991. Under indexing, the lowest 
marginal tax rate (2 percent) is applied to taxable income between $0 and $1,600, 
while the highest marginal tax rate (11 percent) is applied to taxable income in 
excess of $57,600.
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Since 1980, the maximum amount in each bracket has increased by more than 
60 percent. As a result, individuals face lower marginal tax rates than they otherwise 
would without indexing. For example, an individual with taxable income of $23,000 
without indexing would face a 10 percent marginal tax rate; with indexing, the 
marginal tax rate is 8 percent.
Table: Montana 1991 Taxable Income Brackets Indexed for Inflation
Nominal 
Taxable Income 
( $ }
1991 Indexed 
Taxable Income 
1$)
Income Tax 
Rates
0-1 ,000 0-1,600 2%
1,001-2,000 1,601-3,300 3%
2,001-4 ,000 3,301-6 ,600 4%
4,001-6 ,000 6,601-9,900 5%
6,001-8 ,000 9 ,901-13 ,200 6%
8,001-10 ,000 13,201-16,400 7%
10,001-14 ,000 16,401-23,000 8%
14,001-20 ,000 23,001-32 ,900 9%
20,001-35 ,000 32,901-57 ,600 10%
35,001 4- 57,601 + 11%
Source: Montana Department of Revenue
M ontana’s personal income tax structure is similar to that of many states in 
the computation of taxable income. While the state’s income tax structure was 
somewhat regressive in higher income brackets prior to federal tax reform in the 
1980’s, it now appears to be fairly progressive throughout the income scale. On the 
average, state income tax collections have grown at a faster rate than personal
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income, although indexing has reduced the disparity. Even though M ontana has one 
of the highest top marginal tax rates in the nation, personal income taxes do not 
appear to take a disproportionate share of personal income when compared to the 
rest of the nation.
The use of personal exemptions and increasing marginal tax rates tend to 
make the income tax progressive. Marginal tax rates, however, do not necessarily 
indicate the degree of progressivity of the tax. So-called tax loopholes can offset the 
progressivity implied in marginal tax rates. Conversely, progressivity in the income 
tax structure can be maintained with personal exemptions and a single tax rate. One 
way to determine the progressivity of the income tax is to examine effective tax rates, 
or tax liabilities as a percentage of adjusted gross income.
Changes to the existing personal income tax structure could be accomplished 
in a variety of ways, from tinkering with the existing structure to a major overhaul. 
Repeal of or limits to indexing and federal deductibility and revisions to the tax rates 
are examples of tinkering with the existing system. A  tax structure based on federal 
taxable income or based on federal tax liability is an example of a major overhaul. 
In changing the existing structure, decisionmakers will have to choose among a 
variety of priorities, including the revenue needs of the state, the distributional 
effects of the tax, the economic impacts, and simplicity.
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Part 3 - Corporation Income Taxes 
M ontana is 1 of 44 states and the District of Columbia that taxes the net 
income of corporations. Michigan, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and 
Wyoming do not tax corporations on the basis of net income. Taxes on corporate 
net income differ significantly among the states in terms of tax rates, methods of 
apportionment, and definitions of the taxable unit and taxable income. In general, 
net income is determ ined by subtracting external purchases and internal costs from 
gross receipts.*^ This section reviews the rationale for taxing corporate net income, 
analyzes the M ontana corporation income tax structure, describes the level of 
corporate income tax collections, and compares the Montana tax structure with that 
of other states.
There are two major rationales for taxing the net income of corporations. The 
first is to protect the individual income tax base by including certain corporate source 
income, such as retained earnings, in the corporation tax base. If corporate income 
were not taxed, shareholders could hide income within the corporation. The 
corporate income tax is, however, an imperfect means of getting at this source of 
income. The tax on retained earnings could cause vertical inequities among 
shareholders because the rate structure faced by the corporation may be unrelated 
to the circumstances of the potential taxpayer. Horizontal inequities arise because
^^Robert P. Strauss, "Business Taxes" in Reforming State Tax Svstems, Ed. Steven D. 
Gold (Denver: N ational Conference of State Legislatures, 1986), p. 233.
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corporate source income is taxed differentiy than other sources of income. In 
addition, shareholders would be subject to double taxation when dividends are paid. 
Finally, if the corporation tax is not paid by shareholders but is shifted to workers 
(through lower wages) or consumers (through higher prices), both horizontal and 
vertical inequities may arise.
The second rationale for taxation of corporations is the benefits-received 
principle. Corporations receive many services from state and local governments. Net 
income, however, is perhaps a poor measure of the value of services provided. 
Obviously, corporations with no net income are not taxed (or taxed minimally) for 
services. To the extent that a benefit tax is appropriate for corporations, other tax 
bases may better reflect the value of services received. For example, real and 
personal property would reflect the value of such services as police and fire 
protection and improvements to infrastructure. O ther taxes, such as a value-added 
tax or a gross receipts tax, may be better proxies for benefits received. U nder value- 
added taxes or gross receipts taxes, businesses, whether profitable or unprofitable, 
would be required to pay for services.^^
M ontana first levied a tax on the earnings of corporations in 1917, and the 
current rate is 6.75 percent of net income. Corporate profits, and hence corporate 
income taxes, are very sensitive to economic fluctuations. Between 1982 and 1990,
Minnesota Tax Study Commission, Final Report of the Minnesota Tax Studv 
Commission: Findings and Recommendations. Vol. 1 (St. Paul: Butterworth Legal
Publishers, 1986), pp. 199-200.
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corporation income tax collections exhibited the volatility normally associated with 
this tax. The back-to-back economic recessions of 1980 and 1982, the ups and downs 
of the natural resource industries, and changes in federal corporate income tax law 
all have contributed to the swings in Montana corporation income tax collections.
The table below compares the percentage distribution of corporation income 
taxes with other taxes levied by the state and with the United States as a whole. 
Corporation income taxes account for less than 10 percent of total tax collections 
both in M ontana and in the nation as a whole. In 1989, corporation taxes were 
slightly less significant in Montana than in the United States, and in 1990, the reverse 
was true.
Table: Percentage Distribution of State Tax Revenue, FY 1989 and FY 1990, Montana and 
U.S. Average
Montana 
1989 1990
U.S. Averaae 
1989 1990
Individual Income Tax 36.5% 32.6% 31.2% 32.0%
Corporate Income Tax 7.7% 9.4% 8.4% 7.2%
Sales Taxes 24.6% 21.3% 48.7% 48.9%
General Sales -0- “0* 32.9% 33.2%
Selective Sales 24.6% 21.3% 1 5.8% 1 5.8%
License Taxes 11.0% 10.7% 6.2% 6.3%
Severance Taxes 11.7% 11.2% 1.5% 1.6%
Other Taxes 8.5% 14.8% 4.0% 4,0%
Source: Montana Department of Revenue and U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Tax 
Collections, 1989 and 1990.
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It is not unusual for state corporate income taxes to be paid by multistate 
firms. In Montana, the percentage of corporate income taxes paid by m ultistate 
firms varies from year to year. Typically, 100 corporations pay about 50 percent of 
the corporation income tax in Montana. Of those corporations, 70 to 80 percent are 
multistate firms.^
The table below compares the corporate income tax rates and the relative 
share of corporation income taxes for Montana and eight surrounding states. As the 
table shows, six of the comparison states (including Montana) impose a flat tax rate 
on corporate income, while Colorado, New Mexico, and North Dakota have 
graduated structures. In 1990, the corporation income tax contributed 9.4 percent 
of total state tax revenue collections in Montana. As the table shows, M ontana 
relied more heavily on the corporation income tax than did any of the comparison 
states in 1990.
^  M ontana D epartm ent of Revenue.
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Table: Corporation Income Tax Characteristics of Montana and Surrounding States
Range of 
Rates
Minimum 
Taxable 
Income for Top 
Bracket
FY 90 
Percent of 
Total Tax 
Revenue
FY 90  
Percent of 
Personal 
Income
Arizona 9.3% Alt 4.1 % 0.32%
Colorado 5.0-5.5%  
(2)
$50,001 4.2% 0.21 %
Idaho 8.0% Alt 6.4% 0.51%
Minnesota 9.8% All 7.1 % 0.62%
Montana 6.75% All 9.4% 0.71%
New Mexico 4.8-7 .6%  
(3)
$1,000,001 + 3.1% 0.31 %
North Dakota 3.0-10.5%
(6)
$50,001 4- 6.9% 0.52%
Oregon 6.6% All 5.3% 0.33%
Utah 5.0% All 5.3% 0.42%
Source: Montana Department of Revenue
Although M ontana appears to be somewhat more reliant on the corporation 
income tax as a source of tax revenue, interstate differences in the corporate income 
tax base, tax rates, credits, and the inherent instability of corporation income tax 
collections account for some of the major differences shown in the above tables. 
However, the information presented indicates that corporation income taxes in 
M ontana appear to be fairly stable.
The corporation net income tax is a relatively minor component of M ontana’s 
tax revenue structure. However, the imposition of the tax protects the personal 
income tax base by including income that would otherwise escape taxation. The
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corporation income tax appears to be relatively more important in M ontana than in 
other states, and it takes a slightly higher share of state personal income than it does 
in the nation as a whole. Finally, the data shown indicates that the statutory tax rate 
appears comparable to other states.
It is difficult to evaluate the equity of the corporation income tax because the 
final incidence of the tax is not known. Regardless of who pays the tax, whether 
shareholders, workers, or consumers, vertical and horizontal inequities may arise. 
The tax is also justified on the benefits-received principle, but net income is a poor 
measure of benefit taxes.
The corporation income tax is a convenient revenue-raising source, bu t it is 
inherently unstable because of the cyclical nature of the tax. The instability of the 
tax is compounded by net operating loss carrybacks and carryforwards. Because of 
these factors, it is difficult to accurately forecast tax revenue from this particular 
source.
Despite its weaknesses, the corporation income tax is a familiar and generally 
accepted form of taxation. Changes to the existing corporation income tax structure, 
however, could be accomplished in a variety of ways. A  graduated rate schedule, for 
example, could be imposed. Depending on its structure, a graduated system could 
increase revenue, but it could exacerbate the inherent inequities of the tax. The 
imposition of an alternative minimum tax or the elimination of carryover provisions 
for net operating losses could reduce some of the revenue instability.
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A  more radical alternative would be to eliminate the current structure and 
adopt a new m ethod of taxation, such as a value-added tax. There are several 
advantages to a value-added tax. First, the tax would be imposed on all business 
activity regardless of the legal form of organization (sole proprietorship, partnership, 
or corporation). As such, the imposition of a value-added tax would reflect more 
closely the concept of a benefits tax. Because the tax base is so much broader under 
a value-added tax, the tax rate may be much lower than under a net income tax. As 
a tax on business activity rather than on profits, the value-added tax is a relatively 
stable revenue source. A significant disadvantage of the tax is that it does not 
resolve the vertical and horizontal equity problems inherent in the corporation net 
income tax. Also, its applicability in a state that is only somewhat industrialized, 
such as Montana, is somewhat questionable considering that the only state with a 
value-added tax is Michigan, a highly industrialized state that can export the tax 
largely through car sales across the nation and around the world.
Part 4 - General Sales Taxes 
Sales taxes are of more recent vintage than income taxes. Mississippi first 
imposed the tax in 1932, followed by 26 states between 1933 and 1938. Declining 
revenues from other sources, particularly the income tax, rising costs for relief 
programs, and participation in federal programs during the depression led many 
states to adopt the sales tax in the 1930’s. Forty-five states and the District of 
Columbia now impose general sales taxes. Five states, Alaska, Delaware, New
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Hampshire, M ontana, and Oregon do not have a general sales tax. In 1989, general 
sales taxes accounted for 24 percent of all state and local tax revenue and for 33 
percent of all state government tax revenue.^'*
G eneral sales taxes are taxes on consumer purchases but usually include 
business purchases as well. In most states, sales taxes may be typified as general 
sales taxes on tangible personal property and selective excise taxes on service 
transactions. In an attem pt to reduce the regressive features of sales taxes, many 
states have narrowed the tax base by exempting such items as food, prescription 
drugs, utilities, goods subject to excise taxes, and other items that are politically 
attractive to exempt from the tax. The base narrowing, however, has generally led 
to higher statutory rates and increased administrative and compliance costs. 
Exemptions tend to favor consumers with heavy expenditures in these transactions. 
For example, the exclusion of services from the tax base discriminates against 
consumer preferences for goods.^
The question of whether or not Montana should adopt a general sales tax has 
been a m atter of hot political debate since at least the 1960’s. Once again, the issue 
will come to the forefront during the 1993 legislative session as M ontana’s newly 
elected governor, Marc Racicot, is expected to present a tax reform package that will
"“̂ John F. D ue and John L. Mikesell, Sales Taxation: State and Local Structure and 
Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 2.
^John L. Mikesell, "General Sales Tax", in Reforming State Tax Svstems, (Denver: 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 1986), p. 226.
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include a 4 percent general sales tax. This will be discussed more extensively later 
in this paper.
Part 5 - Excise Taxes 
Selective excise taxes are levies on the sale of particular goods or services 
apart from a general sales tax. With the exception of motor fuels taxes, they are 
typically minor components of a state’s revenue structure. A t the state level, 
selective excise taxes generally include user charges and consumption taxes. M otor 
vehicle taxes and gasoline taxes are the most common examples of a charge for the 
use of goods and services provided by government. These taxes are correlated with 
the use of roads and embody the benefits received principle. Consumption taxes 
(often called "sin taxes") are levied on goods that society regards as perhaps 
somewhat undesirable, such as cigarette and alcohol taxes. An additional rationale 
for consumption taxes is that they internalize the costs to society that may occur as 
a result of using the product.
Excise taxes tend to be regressive and are often thought to be unfair on the 
ability-to-pay criterion. If excise taxes are a source of general fund revenue, they 
may be inequitable. However, they may not be unfair if they are levied as user 
charges, as is the case for most motor fuels taxes.
Part 6 - Value-Added Tax 
A  value-added tax (VAT) is a single, flat-rate tax that is applied to all business 
activity within a taxing jurisdiction, regardless of whether the form of ownership is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship. All forms of business are taxed 
on the basis of the value they add to the economy. Because the tax applies to all 
business activity, the tax base is very large, relative to other forms of taxation, which 
allows for a relatively low tax rate. In fact, one type of value-added tax has the same 
theoretical tax base as the general retail sales tax.
Generally, value-added taxation has been used only at the national level, most 
notably in Europe and Mexico. Currently, Michigan is the only state that has 
adopted a value-added tax, but this tax either has been or is being considered by 
several other states.
For an individual firm, value added can be thought of as the difference 
between what the firm receives in revenue when it sells its product(s) and what it 
costs that firm to purchase the materials (or goods and services) that went into 
producing that product. This difference is the "value added" by the production 
process. In accounting terms, value added can be described as follows; Value 
Added =  Revenue - Total Cost of Materials. Under the value-added tax concept, 
each individual firm would compute its value added as its tax base and apply the tax 
rate to that value to determine tax liability.^
In practice, every seller in the commercial chain collects the tax from the buyer 
and remits it to the state. The buyer then collects the tax on subsequent sales and
Larry Finch, 'T he Value-Added Tax: An Alternative Approach to Comprehensive 
Tax Reform in Montana" (Helena, Montana: Office of Research and Information, M ontana 
Department of Revenue, September 1992), p. 3.
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is allowed a credit for the taxes paid to the previous seller. The ultimate consumer 
is not entitled to a credit and, in theory, bears the entire tax burden (incidence).
For example, if a consumer finds a screwdriver In a hardware store with the 
shelf price m arked at $5.00, then that is the amount required to purchase the tool. 
The total VAT amount from all levels of production will already be included in the 
shelf sale price of the item.
Alternatively, if a sales tax is in place rather than a VAT, the customer would 
purchase the same screwdriver for a shelf price theoretically lower than the shelf 
price under a VAT system. The sales tax would then be applied at the counter so 
that the total price paid by the customer would equal $5.00, the same overall price 
as under a VAT. (Interestingly, since Michigan also has a general sales tax along 
with a VAT, the ultimate purchase price would be $5.00 plus an additional sales tax 
amount.)
There are various methods of calculating the VAT tax base, but this paper will 
not explore their complexities. The important feature is that all methods result in 
the same tax base. There are also many combinations allowing for several different 
types of VAT, but this paper will only discuss the end result of applying a common 
approach of this sort of taxation with administrative ease.
The am ount of revenue that a VAT would raise in M ontana depends on 
several factors, including the type of VAT implemented, the tax rate, and any special 
exemptions, credits, or other provisions that act to reduce the base. Estimates of the
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revenue generating potential from a VAT are calculated by examining the state-level 
theoretical tax base associated with a VAT.
In 1990, revenue from a 4% VAT would have generated about $379 million 
in M ontana before any consideration of practical or political reductions in the tax 
base. This represents estimated revenue as measured under the broadest possible 
consumption type VAT. Qearly, revenue would be less than this amount in the 
wake of administrative and political considerations that in all likelihood would act 
to reduce the tax base. This estimated revenue amount is very close to recent 
estimates of revenue that would be generated under a general retail sales tax. Sales 
tax revenue in Montana under the broadest of all possible sales tax bases has been 
estimated at $377 for tax year 1990, which is quite comparable to the VAT estimate 
above.
A n alternative m ethod to gauge the revenue potential from a value-added tax 
is to compare the size of M ontana's economy with that of Michigan and relate that 
comparison to revenue generated under Michigan’s VAT. This approach indicates 
a Michigan-type VAT would have generated about $126 million in M ontana in 1990, 
using the Michigan tax rate of 2.35%. Based on the Michigan experience, a 4 
percent VAT would have raised for Montana between $292 million and $356 million 
in 1990 (using both a narrow and broad tax base).^
Ibid., pp.12-13.
Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
The above estimates provide a rough approximation of the revenue potential 
from a M ontana VAT. The approach is necessarily simplistic due to the absence of 
the data necessary to conduct a more sophisticated analysis. Nevertheless, the above 
estimates indicate that the VAT has the potential to rival M ontana’s currently largest 
source of revenue, the individual income tax, and M ontana’s potentially new source 
of revenue, the general sales tax, in revenue generation.
O f fundamental concern to policymakers is the impact of tax changes on 
various sectors of the economy. A n examination of the possible impact a VAT 
would have on M ontana’s 50 largest corporate taxpayers shows that, at a 4 percent 
rate, a VAT would have generated over twice the revenue generated under current 
law over the period 1988-1990. In 1988, the Montana corporate income tax rate of 
6.75 percent generated about $22 million compared to a calculated VAT revenue 
generation of about $54 million. Similar figures for 1989 are $25 million compared 
to $53 million, and 1990 figures show $22 million versus $49 million from a VAT.
The revenue-neutral VAT tax rate for these corporations would have been 
about 1.77 percent over the three year period. In other words, to insure that the top 
50 corporations would pay no additional tax as a group under the VAT, the rate for 
all businesses could be no higher than 1.77 percent. This would reduce revenue from 
a broad-based VAT from around $356 million, as discussed above, to about $158 
million.-^ In this perspective, some of the trade-offs become apparent.
29 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
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Chapter 5 
TAX REFO RM  IN 1993 
Comprehensive tax reform has been a major issue facing the state of M ontana 
for at least the past six years (since the passage of 1-105 in 1986 freezing property 
taxes) and probably for the past two or three decades. The apparent need for 
comprehensive tax reform seems to stem from three different sources: a mandate 
from the electorate, a deteriorating fiscal system, and a perceived poor business 
climate.
The state's current tax structure is often cited as one of the principal reasons 
why the state consistently receives low marks in studies and surveys ranking state 
business climates, M ontana is often ranked among the worst states in this regard. 
Particularly troublesome to analysts of state business climates is M ontana’s absence 
of a general retail sales tax, the relatively high tax rates on business personal 
property, and the relatively high top marginal personal income tax rate.
Part 1 - Budget Deficit 
The state legislature has been struggling to find an appropriate means of 
funding an ever growing structural budget deficit. In six of the past nine years, state 
general fund and school equalization account revenues have failed to keep pace with 
spending, notwithstanding several across-the-board spending reductions initiated by
49
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current and past administrations and legislatures.^® Revenue shortages forced two 
special legislative sessions to be held in 1992 alone. Recent estimates have placed 
the state’s structural deficit as high as $200-$350 million by July 1, 1995.^^
In fact, on November 20, 1992, in his report to the Legislative Revenue 
Oversight Committee, Terry Johnson, Principal Fiscal Analyst in the Office of the 
Legislative Fiscal Analyst, stated that the projected state budget deficit on January 
1,1993, would be approximately $200 million. In calculating that level of deficit, Mr. 
Johnson included no increases in funding for any state programs. In other words, 
if the 1993 legislature desires simply to maintain government services at their current 
level, existing taxes must be increased substantially or a new and sizeable source of 
revenue must be found immediately. Otherwise, drastic cuts or a combination of 
cuts and revenue increases must be implemented.
Obviously, the deficit problem is a serious one that will not simply disappear 
with the addition of retired newcomers in the Flathead, Gallatin, and Bitterroot 
Valleys. To address recent budget crises, the legislature has been wont to apply 
"band-aids" to supply one-time cash infusions and accounting gimmicks to reduce the 
hemorrhaging in the short term. As Representative Bob Gilbert of Sidney said
Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, "The Montana Historical Revenue and 
Expenditure Report, Fiscal Years 1979 through 1991," (Helena, Montana: Office of the 
Legislative Fiscal Analyst, June 1992).
Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, "Appropriations Report, 1993 Biennium, July 
1992 Special Session," (Helena, Montana: Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, July 
1992).
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during the second special legislative session of 1992, "Folks, the band-aid box is 
empty, and the wounds haven’t stopped bleeding yet; in fact, they continue to get 
worse. It’s time for the Montana Legislature to take a hard look at our state’s 
budget and address tax reform in a responsible manner."
Part 2 - Sales Tax and O ther Options 
All of the past and current proposals for comprehensive tax reform that have 
received serious attention by the legislature attem pt to rectify M ontana’s fiscal 
dilemma through a combination of property tax and income tax relief, funded 
through the enactm ent of a general retail sales tax. Proposals of this nature have 
been discussed extensively since the 1987 legislative session. Indeed, in the 1992 
election year, both the Republican and Democrat gubernatorial candidates endorsed 
a general sales tax as a means by which to provide comprehensive tax reform and 
additional revenue to fund state and local governments.
Invariably, however, reform proposals that rely on a general sales tax include 
provisions requiring final approval of the tax through the referendum process. 
Historically, proposals for a general sales tax that have been voted on by the 
electorate have m et with failure in Montana. While there is speculation that a 
majority of voters now recognize the need for a general sales tax in M ontana, 
particularly evidenced by the voters’ selections in the race for Governor in the June 
1992 Prim aiy election, there remains the strong possibility that such a referendum 
would not be approved.
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There has been little in the way of alternative proposals for comprehensive tax 
reform in the absence of a general sales tax. Politically, it is unlikely that existing 
taxes could be raised enough to fund the structural deficit, especially considering that 
one of the major purposes of the current plans for comprehensive tax reform is to 
provide relief in existing income and property taxes. In addition, the ongoing 
depressed economic climate in the natural resources industries makes it unlikely that 
taxes could be raised significantly in that sector.
The only alternative to sales tax drawing much interest from legislators is the 
value-added tax (VAT), discussed fairly extensively above. The only state using a 
VAT is Michigan, which also has a sales tax. In many ways, a VAT is quite similar 
to a sales tax, but it is being viewed in some political circles as preferable to a sales 
tax merely because it has a different name. Since consumers in theory ultimately pay 
the VAT when purchasing a product, as is also the case with a sales tax, the VAT 
carries the baggage of potentially being a highly regressive tax, particularly harmful 
to low-income individuals. If a VAT were instituted in Montana as part of a tax 
reform plan, the type and level of accompanying tax relief afforded to property and 
income tax would likely be different than a tax reform plan with a sales tax. 
However, until a specific proposal surfaces, those details will remain unknowns.
Part 3 - Racicot vs. Bradlev Tax Plan
The dynamics in the race for the office of Governor in M ontana in 1992 were 
both unusual and fascinating. On the Democrat side, a veteran legislator from
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Bozeman, Dorothy Bradley came out early and immediately embraced tax reform 
with the center piece of her plan being the implementation of a 4 percent general 
sales tax. Ms. Bradley faced much criticism from her two more "traditional" 
Dem ocrat opponents in the Primary battle, who both predictably opposed the sales 
tax altogether, and from some interest groups generally recognized as Democrat 
loyalists (e.g., AFL-CIO). Despite quite vocal challenges within her own political 
party in opposition to a sales tax, Ms. Bradley won the June Primary election and 
used the momentum of her impressive victory to bring her former adversaries in the 
Dem ocrat Party into her camp. Ms. Bradley, along with her tax reform  plan 
containing a sales tax, were catapulted into a favored position to win the November 
election.
O n the Republican side, the expected suddenly became the unexpected when 
Governor Stan Stephens suffered a physical ailment soon after the end of the first 
special legislative session in January 1992 that caused him to back out of his race for 
re-election. Stepping forward was Attorney General Marc Racicot who quickly put 
together a campaign team  and easily won the Primary election in June. Although 
his victory in June was by a sizeable margin, the lack of time in preparing specific 
proposals for public analysis put him in the position as the underdog in the fall.
Eventually, Mr. Racicot put forward his tax reform plan, which also included 
a 4 percent sales tax, and touted it as the centerpiece of his platform. The stage was 
then set for the public to decide which candidate, Bradley or Racicot, presented a
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tax reform  plan most closely aligned with individuals’ views of taxation and the role 
of government in their lives. In the end, Racicot rallied and won the race by a small 
margin. A  brief look at their tax reform plans is worthwhile before examining the 
1993 legislative session.
As mentioned above, both plans featured a 4 percent general sales tax as a 
way to diversify the tax base and to provide a "level playing field" for all taxpayers. 
Their position was that a sales tax will clear the way for Montana to reduce income 
and property (including business equipment) taxes to levels more competitive with 
other states. They theorized that the changes would greatly aid in repairing the 
state’s economy by creating a friendlier environment for business, resulting in job 
growth. Also, both candidates saw a sales tax as a way for the government to 
capture some money from tourists and part-time residents for services they currently 
get for free, such as police protection.
The amount of revenue raised from the sales tax was similar for both plans. 
Bradley projected collections of about $340 million in the first year, and Racicot 
estim ated his sales tax would net about $325 million. Both plans called for a 
m andatory vote of the public on whether or not to adopt a sales tax, following 
approval of a specific proposal by the legislature. Racicot favored a special election 
in February 1993 while the legislature is in session or, alternately, in June 1993, with 
the tax going into effect eight or nine months later. Bradley targeted a special 
election in June 1993 with the sales tax going into effect on July 1, 1994. H er ballot
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proposal would also include a non-sales tax option (higher income and property 
taxes). Racicot supported a constitutional cap on the sales tax rate level. Both plans 
exem pted such items as food, medical services, prescription drugs, and agricultural 
products.
The big differences in the plans centered around what would be done with the 
money from the sales tax. Both advocated using some of the pot to reduce income 
and property taxes. Racicot's plan included total tax relief of $202 million, while 
Bradley’s plan allowed a lower level of tax relief at $138 million, a difference in total 
tax relief of $64 million.
In income tax relief, Bradley proposed a $19 million annual reduction by 
making state income tax an unspecified flat percentage of the federal tax and by 
eliminating the tax for families with an annual income of less than $13,000. Racicot, 
on the other hand, offered $53 million of annual income tax relief by replacing 
current income tax rates with a progressive 6 percent flat tax based on a taxpayer’s 
federal adjusted gross income.
For property tax, Racicot’s plan provided $109 million relief a year on homes 
($60 million) and business equipment ($49 million). Homeowners would be allowed 
to deduct the first $20,000 of m arket value of their homes on their property taxes. 
For business equipment, he advocated dropping the property tax rate from 9 percent
Tribune Staff, "Racicot, Bradley Tax Plans," (Great Falls, Montana: G reat Falls 
Tribune. October 18, 1992), p. IB.
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to 4.5 percent ($36 million savings) and completely eliminating the tax on furniture 
and fixtures ($13 million in annual relief).^^
Bradley’s plan, which provided $87 million in annual property tax relief, was 
similar in approach but differed in degree. She would allow homeowners to deduct 
the first $15,000 of home market value on property taxes, resulting in annual savings 
of $50 million. The business equipment tax rate would be reduced from the current 
level of 9 percent to 6 percent, saving $24 million per year. The tax on furniture and 
fixtures would also be eliminated, saving $13 million annually.
Concerning deficit reduction or elimination, Racicot’s plan allocated $77 
million per year to reduce the projected budget shortfall, while Bradley proposed 
$100 million for that purpose. In rebates, Bradley proposed $32 million for low- 
income people, while Racicot targeted $40 million to low-income people, renters, and 
retirees. Racicot agreed that cities and counties should have the authority to ask 
their voters for a 1 percent local sales tax (beyond the 4 percent state sales tax), but 
Bradley included no provision in her plan for a local option sales tax.
One of the major differences between the two plans, which no doubt was an 
important factor in voters’ minds, was in the area of new spending. Racicot 
proposed no new spending, and, in fact advocated $40 million per year in state 
budget cutbacks, but did intend to set aside $45 million in sales tax proceeds to 
create a reserve fund to help the state deal with future shortfalls. Bradley supported
”  Ibid., p. 1.
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$102 million in new state expenditures on existing programs in education, human 
services, and parks. ̂
Part 4 - 1993 Legislative Session 
Now the stage is set for the 1993 Montana Legislature to address 
comprehensive tax reform. Republican Marc Racicot will be sitting in the 
Governor’s seat, and his tax reform plan will surely be placed before the lawmakers 
for their consideration. Governor Racicot’s plan will presumably have a friendly 
welcome in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, but the Senate, 
controlled by Democrats by a wide margin, could be a much different situation.
Dem ocrats in M ontana have traditionally opposed a sales tax, largely because 
of the negative effects its inherent regressivity has on fixed and low income folks. 
Therefore, many strong foes of a tax reform plan touting a sales tax are likely to 
exert strong effort to derail any such proposal reaching the Senate. In order to avoid 
the specter of a sales tax, perhaps the Democrats will offer a value-added tax (VAT) 
as part of their own tax reform plan that will eliminate the deficit and provide a new, 
large source of tax revenue.
34 Ibid., p. 4.
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Chapter 6
TAX R EFO RM  AND PUBLIC ADM INISTRATION 
The field of Public Administration in general and public administrators in 
particular are faced with interesting questions and challenges in analyzing tax reform 
and determining the proper role and position that the academic field and the 
practicing professionals should be taking while the issue is being debated and 
ultimately decided. During this time of budget shortfalls in Montana (and in many 
other states across the United States), what role should public administrators and 
Public Administration be playing, and what positions should they be taking? Should 
administrators be staunchly defending and guarding their programs from the budget 
axe in the legislature? Should they be attempting to expand their programs? Should 
they be prioritizing their programs and putting forward ideas for elimination of entire 
programs and cost savings? Should they be actively promoting a sales tax or a VAT? 
Should they stand on the sidelines and hope for survival? How should the field of 
Public Administration be adjusting its theories and principles to reflect an era of 
extremely tight budgets?
There are also concerns about tax reform of a mostly mechanical nature that 
should be of interest to public administrators, but they are secondary in comparison 
to m atters regarding possible reductions in employee levels, inadequate (or worse) 
program funding levels, and struggling to sustain organizational operations. M atters 
such as how to implement a sales tax from an administrative view or how to adjust
58
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program  funding mechanisms under tax reform are important for those directly 
involved, but there is typically adequate information from, for instance, other states 
who have previously gone through similar changes. Therefore, these matters will not 
be the subject of discussion in this paper.
Regardless of the method used in the budgeting process, the days of agency 
administrators coming before the legislature with a somewhat padded budget, 
including requests for additional FTE’s and extraordinary capital purchases are truly 
gone. The state of M ontana is on the verge of being "broke, " not having even nearly 
enough revenue to fund existing programs at current levels (as discussed in the above 
related section). W ithout the approval of a tax reform plan during the 1993 
legislative session that includes a new and sizeable source of revenue, there could be 
massive employee layoffs and the termination or suspension of many state programs.
Public administrators would be wise to recognize the reality of this situation 
and to play a constructive role as the legislature and administration work to structure 
government to maximize public benefit with fewer dollars. If Dorothy Bradley had 
been elected Governor, public administrators could have breathed a sigh of relief 
knowing that over $100 million from the proposed sales tax would have been infused 
into the state budget as new spending. However, Marc Racicot in the Governor’s 
chair is reality, and he proposes that government spending will actually be reduced 
by $40 million per year. Obviously, every public administrator faces exposure for 
budget cuts and potential loss of jobs and programs.
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This is a relatively new environment having frustrating and challenging factors 
and circumstances to which public administrators must adjust and quickly find the 
best approach. If an administrator stands idly by while the legislature decides his/her 
personal fate along with the future of the programs being administered, a rationale 
will likely soon be developed targeting this individual and program as nonessential.
The decision facing the 1993 legislature is whether to make perm anent cuts by 
eliminating programs or to make across-the-board cuts leaving programs mostly 
intact or to structure a combination of the two. The point is there will be cuts one 
way or another. There are definite dangers for an administrator to advocate across- 
the-board cuts in an attem pt to save programs and jobs in hopes that the revenue 
picture will become bright in a few years and full funding can be restored. The 
effectiveness of a program having only a large enough budget to cover pared down 
administrative costs would be severely harmed. Staff morale could easily become a 
serious problem.^^ A nother problem for an administrator to cope with under shoe­
string funding is the strong likelihood of loss of experienced professionals (engineers, 
accountants, economists, etc.), again adversely affecting a program’s effectiveness and 
organizational morale.
Considering that the downsizing of state government appears imminent, 
"survival of the fittest" may become the new motto of public administrators, and only
Donald A, Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), p. 337.
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those who are best prepared for the battle will literally continue to exist, while others 
will be forced to move on to other activities. The "reflective practitioner" discussed 
in the book by the same name, written by Donald A. Schon, would likely rally his 
"clients" behind the value of the program, stressing to each client the advantages of 
the program 's continued existence.^® Of course, the same rationale would apply in 
convincing politicians at various governmental levels and interested taxpayers of the 
high value of the organization’s program.
The first step in the Racicot plan to reduce government spending by $40 
million per year is to prioritize existing programs. That process will be crucial to the 
survival of public administrators and programs. A  program administrator would be 
best served to become a fierce and extremely vocal advocate of the program. H ard 
decisions will be made, and administrative neutrality could easily be interpreted as 
indifference to continued operation of a particular program.
Anthony Downs, in his book Inside Bureaucracy, discusses the different types 
of administrators - climbers, conservers, and mixed-motive officials. Downs describes 
climbers as people who constantly seek to maximize and increase their own power, 
income, and prestige through such techniques as job promotion, self-aggrandizement, 
or jumping from one organization to another. Conservers, who are not as ambitious 
as climbers, seek to maximize their security and convenience by holding on to the 
present condition with the least amount of effort possible. Mixed-motive officials
36 Ibid., pp. 290-297.
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seek policy goals connected with the public interest and are motivated by altruistic 
loyalty to the program or the cause being addressed. Administrators generally lean 
toward one of the three types described.
Considering the survival circumstances public administrators will likely be 
facing during the 1993 legislative session, the mixed-motive officials will probably be 
most successful. Climbers may be too interested in themselves rather than the 
programs they administer, and conservers simply may not be able to adjust to a 
drastic change in the status quo. However, mixed-motive officials will be both able 
to em brace dramatic change and to meet the challenge of justifying the continued 
existence of the program addressing the policy goals they are passionately pursuing. 
Their desire for the continuation of a program will be motivated by idealism, in a 
sense, as much as self-interest, whereas the concerns of both climbers and conservers 
would center around their own personal needs.
According to Downs, there are three variations of mixed-motive officials, all 
of which are highly motivated to pursue the public interest. "Zealots," "advocates," 
and "statesmen" all have qualities essential in convincing decision makers of the 
importance of their programs. Their names fairly well describe their traits, and each 
serves a highly useful purpose in aggressively seeking what best suits their 
organizations. Their loyalties to the program and strong belief in pursuit of the 
public interest will serve well as they fight for high prioritization of the program and 
adequate funding of operations. Also, they are likely to encourage goal diversity
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within their organizations to generate expansionary forces adding to the power of 
their organizations/^
In his essay "Bureaucracy," Max Weber spelled out the characteristics of 
bureaucracy and administrators/® Mr. W eber’s description of public administration 
under model and involatile circumstances do not anticipate the modem dilemma of 
fighting for continued survival and adequate funding of operations. A public 
adm inistrator seeking help in figuring out the best approach in presenting a case to 
the legislature that his/her program or agency deserves adequate funding may not 
find much solace in reading W eber’s writings. He provided an impressive framework 
for organizing and operating a bureaucracy, but the budgetary circumstances of today 
exceed the limits of his recommendations.
Perhaps H erbert Kaufman more adequately addresses this situation in 
"Administrative Decentralization and Political Power" when he says, "„.[T]he 
administrative history of our governmental machinery can be construed as a 
succession of shifts..., each brought about by a change in emphasis among three 
values; representativeness, politically neutral competence, and executive
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracv. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 
pp. 92-111.
Max W eber, From Max Weber: Essavs in Sociology, by H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills, (Oxford University Press, Inc., 1946). Found in Classics of Public Administration, by 
Jay M. Shafritz and A lbert C. Hyde (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing 
Company, 1987), pp. 50-55.
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leadership."^^ The point he makes is that traditional modes of representation 
before decision makers and of administrative leadership may no longer suffice. In 
order to survive, an organization will have to be well organized with a broad 
spectrum of strong support for its continued existence, and its leaders will have to 
be aggressive advocates of the public interest being served by the program.
Actually, this will be a good test for those public administrators who adhere 
to the "social equity" approach promoted by H. George Frederickson. He advocates 
going beyond the classic description of public administration as the efficient, 
economical, and coordinated management of services by adding social equity as a 
goal worth pursuing. Since the followers of Frederickson have not been acting in a 
neutral m anner by being committed to both good management and social equity 
(generally striving to improve the quality of life for all) as values, they might actually 
have developed close ties with clients that will ease the task of rallying these groups 
behind the program and organization.^"
This approach is consistent with the theory that the bureaucracy is the most 
representative entity in government and can serve as a valid source of public
H erbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," Public 
Administration Review. (Vol. 29, January-February 1969), pp. 3-15. Found in Classics of 
Public Administration, by Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, (Pacific Grove, California; 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 389-390.
H. George Frederickson, "Toward a New Public Administration," from Toward a New 
Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective. (Chandler Publishing Company, 
1971). Found in Classics of Public Administration, by Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, 
(Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 424-434.
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sentim ent before the legislature, as advocated by Krislov and Rosenbloom.**’ A  
public adm inistrator using this theory can make the argument before the legislature 
that he/she has spoken directly with and is actually speaking on behalf of the 
legislators’ own constituents, who have shown definite preference for the 
continuation of the program in question.
Even for those programs that survive, the administrators will have to learn 
quickly how to do more with the same amount of, or less, resources. The conflict 
between effectiveness and efficiency in providing services is certainly a reality, but 
public adm inistrators should view this situation as a challenge that must be met 
directly with innovation and energy. Performing tasks for society at a high level of 
quality with limited or reduced resources will become increasingly difficult, and 
public administrators must adopt to this new environment.
Now that funding is clearly limited, public administrators should learn from 
the constructive aspects of the career of Robert Moses, who has been described as 
America’s greatest builder in the country’s greatest city, New York City. He handled 
politicians and budget problems incredibly and showed that aggressiveness and 
innovative tactics in public administration can effect positive results. As explained 
by Robert Caro in The Power Broker. Moses succeeded through careful analysis
Samuel Krislov and David H. Rosenbloom, "Representative Bureaucracy and the 
American Political System," from Representative Bureaucracv and the American Political 
System. (Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 21-26, 189-193. Found in Classics of Public 
Administration, by Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde (Pacific Grove, California: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 529-537.
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before taking action and by looking for solutions creatively without bowing to the 
status quo.
U nder these almost crisis conditions, an administrator should become 
introspective, beginning with a careful review of the organizational structure to insure 
that the people in charge at the various levels of bureaucracy truly are carrying out 
the goals of the organization and program being administered. Also, the 
adm inistrator should examine personnel policies and management techniques to 
determ ine if productivity is being maximized. As Donald A. Schon says, "In general, 
the more an organization depends for its survival on innovation and adaptation to 
a changing environment, the more essential its interest in organizational learning.'"*^ 
That statem ent clearly describes the challenge for public administrators during the 
1993 legislative session, and these same administrators should be pursuing all 
potential avenues in finding cost savings and emphasizing streamlining without 
jeopardizing (or at least successfully minimizing) the effectiveness of a particular 
program.
If the adm inistrator determines that management techniques and work 
atmosphere are not fostering self-motivation and employee satisfaction, then 
productivity has not been maximized and internal management changes are required. 
The administrator should begin with him/herself in making the necessary changes and
Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action, 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), p. 327.
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then implement policies at all levels of the bureaucracy so that productivity will 
indeed be maximized.
Once the internal structure and motivational techniques are adjusted to more 
easily accomplish the goals of the organization, then the internal procedures should 
be carefully examined. Any outdated, duplicative, or unnecessary functions and tasks 
should be eliminated or modified to promote internal efficiency.
A t this point, the administrator should be left with an organization that is 
performing at higher levels of productivity and efficiency without adversely affecting 
the effectiveness of the service provided. This is important because an administrator 
should always keep proper perspective that the role of the organization is to provide 
the service to the public in the best possible maimer.
W hen going before the legislature, the administrator can demonstrate steps 
that have been taken to streamline the operation of the agency and increase the 
productivity of the employees, while not sacrificing the provision of service to the 
public. By establishing credibility with a client group, especially ones typically cynical 
of government programs, the administrator will set the stage for an improved 
likelihood of favorable treatm ent in the process of prioritizing programs and when 
requesting adequate funding to improve the effectiveness of providing the public with 
its service.
In order to succeed in this era of finite resources, an administrator must be 
proficient in the teachings of public administration in order to be aware of the
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options available in managing an agency or program to find balance between 
effectiveness and efficiency. W ithout internal efficiency, the effectiveness of the 
organization suffers due to lack of legislative support. W ithout effectiveness, the 
organization is subject to harsh public criticism.
The conflict between effectiveness and efficiency will always be present, and 
adm inistrators need constantly to be aware of the goals and the internal workings of 
the organization in order to keep these two opposing concepts in proper perspective 
and balance. As budgets become increasingly tighter and the public cries for more 
government services, success will come to well-informed, innovative, and aggressive 
adm inistrators who not only understand this dynamic conflict, but who are also able 
to implem ent constructive changes needed to maintain equilibrium and a high 
enough priority status to continue functioning.
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION
A fter many years of debate and frustration, tax reform in M ontana will take 
center stage during the 1993 legislative session. The major issue to be decided is 
w hether o r not to implement a general sales tax (or perhaps, alternatively, another 
new tax revenue source such as a value-added tax). The battle will no doubt be 
fierce, but without that piece of the tax reform puzzle, the whole concept is 
guaranteed to fail leaving M ontana’s budget and economic future in a dire 
predicament. The budget deficit is already at the $200 million mark, and to ignore 
a potential new revenue source will require either massive tax increases, massive 
budget cuts, or some sort of combination of the two. W ithout tax relief, M ontana’s 
business climate is likely to continue to be perceived negatively hurting the state’s 
ability to compete for economic development.
Regardless of the good intentions of all involved, because of the power split 
existing in the 1993 legislature, the result for tax reform in Montana in 1993 could 
be no progress caused from absolute political gridlock. The test for the parties and 
elected officials in power in their respective positions will be to seek compromise 
wherever it is mutually beneficial. As long as the tone throughout the session 
remains conciliatory and cooperative, then tax reform has a strong possibility of 
becoming a reality for M ontana. If, however, lines are drawn in the sand, then 
Montanans will likely be forced to wait two more years for a plan that will address
69
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the goals of adequately funding government programs, at whatever level is deemed 
appropriate (see the differences between the Racicot and Bradley tax reform plans 
discussed in the related section above), while eliminating the budget deficit for the 
long term.
If nothing constructive is done in the 1993 session, however, then the two year 
period between legislative sessions will be terribly difficult for all Montanans. 
Taxpayers will possibly be faced with increased levels of existing taxes. All 
government programs on the state and local level will be forced to make large-scale 
adjustments due to significantly reduced budgets. The reason is that the decision 
makers in the state of M ontana over the past decade or so have heard the warnings 
from the fiscal experts saying, "Pay now or pay later," but they have chosen not to 
listen. M ontana’s revenue and accounting "band-aid box" is virtually empty, and the 
situation demands immediate attention. In the long-term, tax reform, including a 
new source of tax revenue and tax relief, are definitely in the best interests of both 
the payers and receivers of benefits from government programs.
Regarding the deliberations legislators must make in developing a 
comprehensive tax reform  plan, the challenge is always to consider the "big picture" 
of desirable overall tax policy in judging individual tax proposals. For instance, 
would an excise tax of 5 cents on 12 ounce cans of pop for the purpose of funding 
state parks be considered "good" tax policy? To answer the question, each decision 
maker must weigh his/her particular political philosophy and the political winds "back
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hom e against the generally accepted criteria of "good" tax policy before voting aye 
or nay. The same is true in evaluating a comprehensive tax reform plan of the 
magnitude that will be proffered by Governor Racicot.
The role of public administrators in this process will also be extremely 
important. Programs will best be served by dynamic leaders who will be able to 
convince decision makers that a program deserves high priority ranking for survival 
and adequate funding for effective provision of service. Finding and communicating 
ways to maximize efficiency without affecting quality of service will be a big 
challenge, but the rewards (such as legislative recognition for the effort) may be 
quite tangible. The stakes will be high, and those who falter will potentially cause 
grave harm  to respective organizations and programs.
The future of public administration will be dictated largely by respect for the 
past. Adapting to future conditions while not forsaking time honored principles will 
provide the necessary stability for long-term survival and success in administering 
government programs in an era of extremely tight budgets. Effectively administering 
programs while listening closely to the public voice will instill public confidence. 
Treating accountability and fiscal responsibility as high priorities will lead to 
credibility. Demonstrating concern for human development will foster economic 
growth and social equity. The future result will be a highly respected and dynamic 
public administration.
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If tax reform does indeed become a reality for Montana, the hope is that it 
will be the product of compromise where all affected parties (executive branch, 
legislative branch, taxpayers, program beneficiaries, and public administrators) will 
be winners to the extent possible under the circumstances. If balance is not 
achieved, then undue suffering will result and the call will once again be soon heard 
across M ontana that what the state really needs is a good plan for comprehensive tax 
reform.
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